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Abstract: In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the Parmenides was 
considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will consider what some authors say, 
although in different ages, about how the Parmenides of Plato has been read. My aim is also to 
display that they were in a general accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability 
that this work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main 
source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, 
discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing a 
classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. On the basis of the analysis of some passages 
of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (ch. 6), and of some references present in Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae 
Philosophorum (III, 49), and given some indications in Albinus (Isagoge, III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7), it 
is possible to hypothesize with a certain degree of truth that the Parmenides, for some 
middleplatonists, in some respects, and more generally for the Middleplatonism, represented an 
‘explanatory dialogue’ or ‘expository dialogue’ (ὑφεγηματικός) which contained the indications to 
learn the logical method, while at the same time providing an example of how to exercise in order to 
learn it. 
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Resumo: Neste artigo, mostrarei alguns argumentos que reforçam a ideia de que o Parmênides foi 
considerado um diálogo lógico durante o médio platonismo. Vou considerar o que alguns autores 
dizem, embora em diferentes épocas, sobre como o Parmênides de Platão foi lido. Meu objetivo é 
também mostrar que eles estiveram em um acordo geral: na verdade, dadas essas concordâncias, a 
probabilidade de que esta obra tenha sido classificada entre os diálogos lógicos se torna muito mais 
plausível. A principal fonte para estabelecer isso é representada por Proclo, que, em seu Comentário 
sobre o Parmênides de Platão, discute as tradições de interpretação relacionadas a este diálogo, 
propondo uma classificação na qual também está incluído o ‘modo lógico’. Com base na análise de 
algumas passagens do Didaskalikos de Alcino (cap. 6) e de algumas referências presentes na Vitae 
Philosophorum de Diógenes Laércio (III, 49), e com algumas indicações em Albino (Isagoge, III, 148, 
19 e segs., VI, 151, 5-7), é possível supor com certo grau de verdade que o Parmênides, para alguns 
médios platonistas, em alguns aspectos, e mais geralmente para o médio platonismo, representava 
um ‘diálogo explicativo’ ou ‘diálogo expositivo’ (ὑφεγηματικός) que continha as indicações para 
aprender o método lógico, fornecendo ao mesmo tempo um exemplo de como se exercitar para 
aprendê-lo. 
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The first commentators who tried to interpret the Parmenides of Plato have 
understood it as a ‘logical’ dialogue. There are sufficient proofs for establishing that 
Platonists, particularly the so-called ‘Middleplatonists’, basically read the Parmenides as a 
dialogue whose content essentially coincided with a logical exercise, or sometimes related to 
the logic in its strict sense.  
In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the Parmenides 
was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will gather these 
arguments by some authors who, in a more or less explicit manner, show to understand the 
Parmenides in a logical sense. I will consider what some authors say, although in different 
ages, about how the Parmenides of Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they 
were in a general accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this 
work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main 
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source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s 
Parmenides, discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, 
proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. 
Therefore, the most important evidence that leads us to defend the existence of a 
logical ‘middleplatonic’ tendency, actualized in a specific way of reading of the Parmenides, 
is traceable in Proclus. In his Commentary to the Parmenides1, indeed, Proclus informs us 
about the various readings of the Parmenides of Plato by tracing a brief history of its 
previous interpretations. In this way, Proclus recognises three lines of understanding the 
Parmenides: the logical one, the metaphysical one and the theological one. This 
classification allow us to seriously consider that the exegetical tradition of the Parmenides in 
the Middle Platonism has been more structured than we get used to think (especially as 
when we reflect on the Middle Platonism we are used to refer to the Timaeus, or perhaps to 
the Republic, that certainly have had a more important role among Platonists of Imperial 
Era). Anyway, taking the cue from the Proclus’ classification, I want to analyse the logical 
reading of the Parmenides because, as we will see, it is likely that the very logic (and the 
logical method) has represented the interpretation-key for the reception of the Parmenides 
in the Middle Platonism.  
Going back to Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides, we find that the three lines 
he classified are not well defined and, additionally, Proclus does not include the names of 
the interpreters. Those who interpreted the Parmenides as a logical dialogue, in addition, 
disagreed with some aspects. As reported by Proclus2, someone thought that the Parmenides 
constituted a reply to Zeno’s book, which contained forty arguments to demonstrate the 
impossibility of admitting the multiplicity of being. According to these authors, Plato would 
have formed a sort of method against the Eleatic philosophers, particularly against Zeno, 
showing how the dialectical method (about which the second part of the Parmenides would 
show an example) would be superior to that used by Zeno3. Such interpretations have been 
supported by some authors who wanted to affirm the presence in the Parmenides of a 
refutation (ἀντιγραφή), or a reaction formulated against the Zenonian discourse and 
method (namely the Zenonian argument against plurality). According to these anonymous 
commentators, Plato would have practiced in the Parmenides the same type of ἀντιγραφή he 
has experimented in the Menexenus, where Plato imitated the funeral prayer pronounced by 
Thucydides but outperforming the style of arguments and the clarity of the expression. For 
the Menexenus would only contain a speech in honour of those who receive state funerals, 
therefore Plato would not write this dialogue to exhibit a particular philosophical content 
but only to rivalry against Thucydides, resuming his oration (imitating it), but in such a way 
that it would turn out to be qualitatively better4. For some of these interpreters then, in the 
Parmenides Plato would be showing an example of this kind of ἀντιγραφή arguing with 
                                                 
1
 Procl. In Prm., 631.11-641.14 (See STEEL, Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon; Id., Procli In Platonis 
Parmenidem Commentaria; LUNA & SEGONDS [éd.], Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon.  
2
 Procl. In Prm., 631.21-632.27. 
3
 On the appropriation by Plato of the Zeno’s method in the Parmenides, see GOURINAT, La dialectique des 
hypothèses contraires dans le Parménide de Platon, pp. 233-261. 
4
 Procl. In Prm., 631.20-631.36: “Καὶ γὰρ εἰωθέναι φασὶν οὗτοι τὸν Πλάτωνα ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀντιῤῥήσεις τὰς πρὸς 
τοὺς ἄλλους τριχῶς· καὶ τὰς μὲν κατὰ μίμησιν ὧν ἐκεῖνοι γεγράφασιν, ἐπὶ τὸ τελειότερον μέντοι προάγοντα τὴν 
μίμησιν καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα προστιθέντα τοῖς ἐκείνων λόγοις, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ πρὸς Θουκυδίδην ἀγωνιζόμενος 
τὸν Μενέξενον ἀπειργάσατο, καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ ῥηθέντα λόγον ἐπὶ τοῖς δημοσία θαπτομένοις εἰς ταὐτὸν μὲν ἐκείνῳ 
καθεὶς, τῇ δὲ τάξει τῶν κεφαλαίων καὶ τῇ εὑρέσει τῶν ἐπιχειρήσεων καὶ τῇ σαφηνείᾳ τῆς ἑρμηνείας πολλῷ δή 
τινι τὸν λόγον τοῦ παρ' ἐκείνου γραφέντος εὐδοκιμώτερον ἀπειργασμένος· τὰς δὲ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν πρὸς οὓς 
ἀγωνίζεται, καθάπερ ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὸν Ζήνωνα”. See STEEL, Une histoire de l’interprétation du Parménide de 
Platon dans l’antiquité, pp. 11-40. 
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Zeno. They grounded this opinion on the certainty that Plato, in the Parmenides, was 
carrying out a refutation conducted through the use of the logical arguments contained in 
the second part of the dialogue5.  
According to Proclus, the second ‘trend’ of the logical interpretation of the 
Parmenides is represented by the ancient commentators who divided the dialogue in three 
main sections (κεφάλαια): the first one (= Prm. 130a3-135c7): containing apories against the 
theory of Forms; the second one (= Prm. 135c8-137c3): focusing on the description of the 
method necessary to grasp the Truths (namely the Ideas); the third and the last one (= Prm. 
137c4-166c5): that consists in the exercise of the method presented. Those who did this 
distinction refused to identify the Parmenides as a controversial dialogue (as did the first 
group of interpreters), being convinced that the three sections of the dialogue had the 
purpose of training in the dialectical exercise (ἄσκησις γυμνασίας)6. In fact, the hypothesis 
of the One, as put forth by Parmenides, represents for them an example of the execution of 
the exercise and would not, instead, constitute its very purpose. In this last case, the 
hypothesis would play in the Parmenides the same role of the ‘fisherman example’ presented 
at the beginning of the Sophist in view of the exercise of the method of the diairesis7. It 
would seem, moreover, that not all the supporters of the logical interpretation have 
identified the γυμνασία with the dialectical method, which, according to some interpreters, 
would be absent in the Parmenides, recognising in it only the logical gymnastics. Some 
philosophers, in fact, thought that in the logical exercise contained in the Parmenides, Plato 
has jointly proposed an anticipation of the technique of argumentation that would be later 
developed by Aristotle, in Topics (Top. VII 14, 163a37b-13)8. In this sense, it appears that 
Aristotle has been the only one to resume the technique of speeches from the Platonic 
Parmenides and to propose it, from his point of view, in the Topics9. 
Anyway, the advocates of the idea that the exercise of the Parmenides has to be 
identified with a simple training useful to develop a discourse technique reject the presence 
                                                 
5
 Plat. Prm. 137b1-166c. 
6
 Procl. In Prm., 634.8-634-17: “Τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων, ὡς κατὰ μεγάλα διελθεῖν, τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ κεφαλαίων, οὕτω 
γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι διαιροῦσιν, ὧν ἓν μέν ἐστι τὰς περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἀπορίας προτεῖνον, ἓν δὲ τὴν τῆς μεθόδου σύντομον 
παράδοσιν ποιούμενον, δι' ἧς ἀξιοῖ γυμνάζεσθαι τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονας, ἓν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν ὡς 
ἐπὶ παραδείγματος τοῦ κατὰ Παρμενίδην ἑνὸς γνώριμον ἀπεργαζόμενον, πάντα πρὸς ἓν βλέπειν ταῦτα, τὴν τῆς 
γυμνασίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄσκησιν”.  
7
 See STEEL, Proclus et l’interprétation ‘logique’ du Parménide, p. 68. 
8
 See also Arist. Top. I, 2, 101a34-36: “πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα 
διαπορῆσαι ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος”. In this passage Aristotle states that when 
we are able to develop an aporia, arguing in one way and another, we will be even more able to discern the true 
from the false (κατοψόμεθα τἀλητές) in every arguments. What Aristotle here says could represent an example 
of the kind of the exercise that some authors recognised in the Parmenides; compare with the passage 136c2-5: 
“καὶ τἆλλα αὖ πρὸς αὑτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅτι ἂν προαιρῇ ἀεί, ἐάντε ὡς ὂν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἄντε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ 
μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές”. In fact, Aristotle also calls the “method” just 
described as a γυμνασία: “which will make it simple to argue on the proposed subject”; see Arist. Top. 101a28-
30: “ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς γυμνασίαν χρήσιμος, ἐξ αὐτῶν καταφανές ἐστι·μέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες ῥᾷον περὶ τοῦ 
προτεθέντος ἐπιχειρεῖν δυνησόμεθα”. Based on this parallel, the method of the Parmenides would be superior 
to that one of Aristotle because the latter in the Topics would argue on ἔνδοξα (commonly shared opinions), 
while Plato in the Parmenides would propose universal rules (καθολικοὶ κανόνες) to reach the truth. For the 
latter argument, see STEEL, Proclus et l’interprétation ‘logique’…, p. 72. 
9
 A confirmation of this argument would be present in Alexander of Aphrodisias, who, commenting on 
Aristotle’s Topics and referring to the γυμνασία of which Aristotle speaks, states that the description of this 
method (‘which will make us able to argue on the proposed subject’) agrees with what Plato writes in the 
Parmenides in so far as: how bodily exercises made according to a specific technique provide a good 
constitution to the body, likewise, the exercises in the subjects performed by the soul are made according to a 
method, giving a good shape to the soul. The good form for the rational soul would correspond to the ability to 
examine (κριτική) and discover the truth. See Alex. Aphr. In Top. p. 27, 27-31, Wallies (CAG 2.2). 
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in the Parmenides of the Platonic dialectical method. This rejection stems from the fact that, 
in the Parmenides, the method proposed by the old Parmenides to the young Socrates, and 
then carried out with the help of the young Aristotle, would not respect what Plato himself 
said elsewhere about dialectics. In the Republic, indeed, it is explicitly said that it is not 
suitable for young people10, and, in general, the method described in the Parmenides, 
according to the proponents of this thesis, would not present none of the typical features of 
Platonic dialectics as presented by Plato, especially in the Republic, in the Phaedrus and in 
the Sophist11. Therefore, the exercise would only coincide with dialectic gymnastics, meaning 
the latter as the technique of ‘well discuss’. 
Since Proclus did not give any name for those who support the various logical 
interpretations, we cannot understand who he is referring to from time to time, nor we can 
ascertain when the interpreters mentioned should be placed. C. Steel thinks that the first 
commentators that found a ‘logical’ dialogue in the Parmenides were probably the 
philosophers of the first century AD, contemporaries of Thrasyllus, who saw in the 
Parmenides, especially its second part, a dialectical exercise executed according to the 
Eleatic method (the Zenonian one)12. On the other hand, during the Imperial Era, Platonic 
philosophers had rediscovered the dogmatic character of Platonic philosophy and were 
intended to affirm some doctrinal aspects of it after a long period of a widespread ‘aporetic’ 
reading of Platonic dialogues. It is therefore probable that the philosophers of this era were 
trying to recognise in the Parmenides a precise doctrinal aspect of Plato. The ‘logical’ aspect 
(concerning the logic) seems to be the most likely one. 
Having established that Proclus fully recognises the presence of a logical 
interpretation of the Parmenides, in addition to this, there is further evidence that allowing 
us to delve into the logical aspect of the middleplatonic exegesis of the Parmenides.  
In the classification of the platonic dialogues, which we know thanks to Diogenes 
Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum and to Albinus’ Eisagoge, it emerges that Plato’s dialogues 
were basically divided into two groups13. We find that, on the one hand, there were the 
‘instructive’ or ‘explanatory’ dialogues, ‘ὑφηγητικοί’14, which give instructions on some 
topics, such as on nature, λόγος, politics or ethics; on the other hand, we find the 
‘investigative’ dialogues, ‘ζητητικοί’, which concern with starting a research on a specific 
issue, often examining the arguments ‘for and against’. These two groups, in turn, have been 
further split into two kind: the first divided in ‘theoretical’, ‘θεωρηματικοί’, which regard 
physical and logical questions, and in ‘practical’ dialogues, ‘πρακτικοί, that debate on ethical 
and political matters15. This second group of dialogues were instead divided in the dialogues 
that served to counteract an opposing thesis (‘ἀγωνιστικοί’) and those that permitted the 
participants in the dialogue (as well as the readers) to exercise themselves in a certain 
technique (‘γυμναστικοί’). Ultimately both the last groups were divided again: the 
‘γυμναστικοί’ into the ‘μαιευτικοί’ dialogues, whose purpose was to help the interlocutor to 
bring out (to give birth) his implicit knowledge, such as in the Alcibiades where Socrates 
helps the young Alcibiades to articulate his vague knowledge; and into the ‘πειραστικοί’ 
                                                 
10
 Plat. R. VII 537e-539d. 
11
 Procl. In Prm. 648.1-658.30.  
12
 See STEEL, Une histoire de l’interprétation du Parménide…, p. 24 
13
 See BALTES & DÖRRIE, Der Platonismus in der Antike. II, pp. 48-50; NÜSSER, Albinus Prolog und die 
Dialogtheorie des Platonismus; TARRANT, Thrasyllan Platonism; MANSFELD, Prolegomena. Questions to be 
Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text, pp. 82-89; STEEL, Une histoire de l’interprétation du 
Parménide…, pp. 27-28. 
14
 The term ‘ὑφηγηματικός’ is the opposite of the term ‘ἀπορητικός’; see LIDDELL; SCOTT & STUART JONES, A 
Greek–English Lexicon. 
15
 Diog. Laert. Vit. Phil., III, 49, 3.  
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dialogues, which consisted in verifying the reliability of a thesis, as in the case of the 
Theaetetus16; as last division, the ‘ἀγωνιστικοί’ were classified in ‘ἐνδεικτικοί’, that 
represented the ‘probative’ dialogues (for example the Protagoras) and in ‘ἀνατρεπτικοί’, 
that were the ‘aversive’ ones, as was classified the Gorgias. The ensuing diagram summarises 
these subdivisions: 
Platonic dialogues 
 
      ὑφηγητικοί                        ζητητικοί 
 
         (λογικοί)  
  
θεωρηματικοί          πρακτικοί                      ἀγωνιστικοί         γυμναστικοί 
 
 
 
ἐνδεικτικοί     ἀνατρεπτικοί 
      
              μαιευτικοί          πειραστικοί 
According to this subdivision, we would expect the Parmenides to be among the 
‘γυμναστικοί’ dialogues17, but, as far as we know, it was not so. Diogenes Laertius18 and 
Albinus19 place the Parmenides among the logical dialogues (‘λογικοί’) along with the 
Sophist, the Statesman (or Politicus) and the Cratylus, and, surprisingly, we learn that the 
logical dialogues are placed in the midst of the ὑφηγητικοί ones. Albinus and Diogenes 
Laertius, in this way, provide us with an important clue about the way in which the 
Parmenides was read in the Middle Platonism, a clue showing an interesting albeit partial 
convergence with the Proclean testimony. Indeed, the Parmenides was part of those Platonic 
dialogues that gave an instruction on Plato's doctrine and, in the specific case of the 
Parmenides, the doctrine recognised was about the logic. The Parmenides, therefore, along 
with the Sophist, the Statesman and the Cratylus, would have contained a logical teaching, 
providing an instruction on the various (correct) ways of knowing the truth. Most likely, it is 
for this reason that Alcinous in his Didaskalikos uses the Parmenides precisely to illustrate 
the Platonic logic (ch. VI). Indeed, Alcinous, an important middleplatonic philosopher, of 
which we have scarce news but whose ‘Didaskalikos’ (also known as the ‘Handbook of 
Platonism’) represents a work of extreme importance for the Imperial Platonism, uses not 
for nothing the Plato’s Parmenides to explain the theory of Aristotelian syllogism as well as 
                                                 
16
 See STEEL, Une histoire de l’interprétation du Parménide…, pp. 27-28. See also the reconstruction of M. 
Baltes, in BALTES & DÖRRIE, Der Platonismus in der Antike.…., II, pp. 513-520. 
17
 This is because if we think at the dialectical exercise contained in the Parmenides, it would be natural to link 
this dialogue to its ‘gymnastic aspect’.  
18
 Diog. Laer. Vit. phil. III, 49.  
19
 Alb. Prol. III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7. However, it is worthy of note that Albinus himself (in the third chapter) 
in the classification he makes of Platonic works puts the Parmenides among the ‘ἐλεγκτικοί’ dialogues. See Alb. 
Prol. III. 14-15.  
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of the ‘ten categories’ doctrine. First of all, an important thing to note about Alcinous is that 
his quotation of some sections of Plato’s Parmenides represents a rarity since we have just 
two direct references to it during the Middle Platonism (namely the Alcinous’ passages 
contained in his Didaskalikos and an other one we find in the Platonist Cavenus Taurus, as 
reported by his pupil Aulus Gellius in the seventh book of his Attic Nights)20. Anyway, in 
chapter six of his work, Alcinous recurs to some sections of the deductive series contained in 
the logical exercise of the Parmenides. This dialogue, in particular, constituted for Alcinous a 
repertoire of examples and illustrations for the theory of the syllogism, which, in turn, 
constitutes one of the branches of the dialectical science. Alcinous points out that for each 
type of syllogism: categorical, hypothetical and mixed (οἱ κατηγορικοί; οἱ ὑποθετικοί; οἱ 
μικτοί), Plato has already provided instances. In the same way, Plato has depicted in the 
Parmenides the doctrine of the ten categories (Καὶ μὴν τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας ἔν τε τῷ 
Παρμενίδῃ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὑπέδειξεν21). All this goes to show that for Alcinous the Parmenides 
was acknowledged as a logical dialogue.  
It can be assumed that Alcinous interpreted the Parmenides in the same manner as 
Diogenes Laertius and Albinus did, intending for ‘logical’ that it was part of the dialogues 
ὑφηγητικοί. The Parmenides, therefore, did give instructions on dialectics and in particular 
on the use of syllogism, which in turn is necessary for the correct use of the λόγος. It is 
probable that it was for the same reason that Albinus argued that the ‘logical dialogues’ 
could also be understood as a typology of the ‘investigative dialogues’ (ζητητικοί)22, to the 
extent that they would examine a particular issue and that, while practicing in an exercise 
(namely, a logical  or dialectical  exercise), they would not lose their instructive nature 
(that is about the logic tout court).  
A further indication to understand how the middleplatonic philosophers considered 
the Parmenides as a logical dialogue is traceable in Galenus. It seems, in fact, that Galenus, 
who possessed a good knowledge of the logical works of Aristotle, and, more generally, 
which had a great interest in logic, considered the Parmenides as a logical dialogue of which 
he composed some ἐπιτομαί, now lost but known by the Arabs23. Even Galenus, so, would 
have seen in the Parmenides a treatise of logic. 
Based on the information displayed, it is possible to hypothesize with some 
confidence that the Parmenides for some middleplatonic authors represented an expository 
dialogue (ὑφεγητικός) that contained the indications to learn the logical method, while at 
the same time provides an example of how to practice in order to learn it.  
This result allows us to draw some historical-philosophical conclusions also inherent 
at the history of interpretation of the ancient texts. In fact, it is known that the Parmenides 
did not play a prominent role during the Middle Platonism. The Timaeus, on the other 
hand, was the capital text for imperial-era authors who planned to systematize the Platonic 
thinking and to dogmatize its main aspects. The reason for the absence of direct quotations 
of the Parmenides in the Middle Platonism is allegedly related to the way in which this 
dialogue was interpreted. Being understood predominantly as a logical dialogue, meaning 
logic in its aspect of ‘exercise’ (as training required for a rigorous use of dialectics), and in its 
properly logical sense (in the narrow sense of the term), this has determined that the 
Parmenides was not sufficiently suitable to be used in a weighty way for the purpose of 
making Platonic thinking unitary and systematic. The difficulties that distinguish the 
                                                 
20
 Aul. Gell. Noct. att. VII, 5-11. 
21
 Alc. Did. 159, 43-44. 
22
 Alb. Prol. VI, 151, 5-7. See MANSFELD, Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled…, n. 138. 
23
 The Fihrist, composed in the 10th century by the bibliographer Ibn al-Adīm, mentions a compendium of the 
Parmenides attributed to Galenus, alongside a collection of logical treatises (together with the Cratylus, the 
Sophist, the Statesman, and the Euthydemus). 
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Parmenides and that concern both the identification of the theme and the unity of the script 
have most likely determined the secondary role (though not entirely) of the dialogue in the 
middleplatonic tradition. The centrality of the Timaeus, on the contrary, could be explained 
on the basis of the topics that peculiarly mark this work. In fact, it traces the outlines of 
Platonic ontology and epistemology, reinforced by the cosmological argument. All this 
guarantees the presence of a wide range of contents required by the endeavour to 
systematization that the Parmenides, unlike the Timaeus, could not easily provide. 
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